DESK REVIEW REPORT

Interventions Addressing Conflict, Polarisation and Social Cohesion in North-Central Nigeria, 2016–2026

A Comparative Analysis of Plateau and Benue States with Wider Regional Findings

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Executive Summary

North-Central Nigeria remains one of the country's most conflict-affected regions. Between 2016 and 2026, Plateau and Benue States experienced recurrent violence linked to competition over land, water and grazing routes; contested indigene–settler relations; ethno-religious polarisation; criminality; displacement; weak accountability; and the rapid circulation of misinformation. These drivers interact: economic and environmental pressures are frequently expressed through ethnic and religious narratives, while governance failures and impunity sustain cycles of reprisal.

This desk review maps government, civil-society, faith-based, community, media, and development-partner interventions addressing conflict, polarisation, and social cohesion in Plateau, Benue, and the wider North-Central region. It distinguishes activities and outputs from outcomes, assesses the strength of available evidence, and identifies practical lessons for future programming.

The review finds that the most promising interventions combine several features: sustained and inclusive dialogue; locally owned peace structures; engagement with traditional and religious authorities; attention to livelihoods and natural-resource governance; and responses to misinformation. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue's (HD) climate-sensitive natural-resource agreements in Benue, the Plateau Peace Building Agency's institutional role, community peace committees, and locally led interfaith and livelihood initiatives are among the stronger examples. However, most evidence of impact remains moderate, limited or short-term. Very few interventions have been independently evaluated over time, and the sustainability of many community structures beyond donor funding is uncertain.

Three findings stand out. First, dialogue and mediation can reduce local tensions and produce agreements, but agreements require implementation mechanisms, resources and enforcement to endure. Second, livelihood and economic interventions show promise where they create shared interests between farmers and herders, but they rarely address land tenure, political incentives or insecurity on their own. Third, misinformation is an increasingly important accelerator of violence; community-level media literacy and conflict-sensitive journalism are promising but still nascent.

The report recommends that future programming prioritise locally anchored peace infrastructure, implementation of existing agreements, accountability and access to justice, climate-sensitive resource governance, women's and youth leadership, trauma-

informed support, and independent monitoring and evaluation. It also recommends further research on the long-term effects of dialogue, the political economy of conflict, cross-border dynamics, and the effectiveness of counter-misinformation work.

1. Background

1.1 Context

Since 1999, Nigeria's North-Central region has experienced persistent violent conflict and social polarisation. Plateau and Benue States have been particularly affected by tensions between farming and pastoralist communities, disputes over land and natural resources, displacement, political contestation, criminality, and narratives built around ethnicity, religion, indigeneity and belonging. The conflict cannot be reduced to a simple farmer–herder framing: resource competition intersects with political, social, economic, ethnic and religious identities.

In Benue, violence has been shaped by competition over land, water and grazing routes, alongside governance failures, criminality and climate stress. In Plateau, the conflict is further structured by the indigene–settler dichotomy, urban ethno-religious tensions, especially in Jos, and contestation over political representation and solid minerals. Available reporting indicates severe human costs, although figures vary across sources and time periods.[1]

1.2 Problem statement

Despite a decade of interventions by federal and state governments, traditional and religious institutions, civil-society organisations, development partners, media organisations and community groups, there is limited consolidated knowledge of what has been attempted, by whom, where, using which approaches, and with what apparent results. This review addresses that gap by mapping interventions and assessing the evidence on what has contributed to reduced tensions, improved relationships or stronger social cohesion, and what appears to have had limited, temporary or unintended effects.

1.3 Purpose and objectives

The purpose of the study was to undertake a desk review and intervention-mapping exercise covering approximately 2016–2026, with particular attention to Plateau and Benue States and

1 Amnesty International. "Mounting Death Toll and Looming Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria." Amnesty International, May 29, 2025. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/nigeria-mounting-death-toll-unchecked-attacks-armed-groups/; Nwafor. "11,749 Killed in Plateau within 4 Years - Senate Report." Vanguard News, January 1, 2026. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/01/11749-killed-in-plateau-within-4-years-senate-report/. Both Commentaries note substantial variation between fatality estimates and different reporting periods; figures should be used with caution.

the wider North-Central region. The review identified and analysed interventions addressing ethno-religious polarisation, farmer–herder conflict, indigene–settler tensions, political mobilisation around identity, misinformation and hate speech, displacement, inter-community grievances, reconciliation, dialogue, mediation and social cohesion.

The central question is: after ten years of interventions, what do we know about the approaches that have helped communities in North-Central Nigeria manage conflict, reduce polarisation and rebuild relationships, and where are the major gaps in knowledge and practice?

1.4 Research questions

The review addressed five sets of questions:

- Intervention landscape: What major interventions have been undertaken since 2016; who implemented, funded or supported them; where were they implemented; whom did they target; what were their objectives, methods and duration?
- Approaches: Which approaches have been most commonly used, including dialogue, mediation, security, livelihoods, governance, communications, misinformation response, reconciliation, interfaith engagement and social cohesion?
- Polarisation: How have interventions addressed stereotypes, “us versus them” narratives, political manipulation of identity, and misinformation or inflammatory media narratives?
- Farmer–herder conflict: What interventions have addressed farmer–herder tensions, what approaches have been used, and what evidence exists on their effectiveness and sustainability?
- Sustainability: Which interventions appear to have survived beyond funding periods, developed local ownership, or depended on continued external support?

1.5 Scope

The priority states are Plateau and Benue. The wider mapping considers Nasarawa, Kogi, Niger, Kwara and the Federal Capital Territory, as well as national or multi-state interventions with a significant North-Central component. The review covers interventions implemented or active between 2016 and 2026.

1.6 Significance

The study provides a foundation for JRI’s broader work on countering polarisation, rebuilding civic cohesion and developing people-centred approaches to peace and justice in North-Central Nigeria. It is intended not as a simple list of projects, but as an evidence-informed analysis of actors, approaches, results, gaps and lessons.

2. Methodology and Analytical Framework

2.1 Research design

Desk research and analytical preparation for this report were undertaken by Dr. Henry Gyang Mang, PhD.

This is primarily a desk-based research and evidence-mapping exercise. The review drew on academic literature, government and policy documents, programme and project reports, evaluations, donor reports, NGO and peacebuilding assessments, media reporting, conference proceedings, policy briefs, project websites, monitoring and evaluation materials, publicly available datasets, and relevant social-media, court and legislative materials.

2.2 Evidence mapping

The review moved beyond descriptions of activities to examine evidence of results. For each intervention, where evidence permitted, it identified the problem addressed, the intervention, immediate outputs, outcomes and sustainability considerations. It distinguished activities (what an intervention did), outputs (immediate products), outcomes (changes plausibly linked to the intervention) and impact (broader changes in conflict, trust or social cohesion).

2.3 Intervention classification

Interventions were classified under eleven broad categories: government and policy; dialogue and mediation; interfaith engagement; farmer–herder and natural-resource interventions; media and information; youth; women; traditional and community mechanisms; justice and accountability; livelihood and development; and political and civic interventions.

2.4 Evidence strength

Evidence was classified as strong, moderate, limited, anecdotal or insufficient. Strong evidence requires multiple independent sources, rigorous methods and consistent findings. Moderate evidence involves some independent verification or a reasonable methodology. Limited evidence rests on a single source or weak methods. Anecdotal evidence consists of individual accounts not systematically collected. Where evidence was insufficient, the review states that no conclusion can be drawn.

2.5 Sustainability assessment

The review assessed whether interventions appeared likely to continue beyond project funding, whether they developed local ownership, and which factors appeared to support sustainability. Particular attention was paid to institutionalisation within state structures, community ownership, funding continuity, coordination and the avoidance of parallel structures.

2.6 Limitations

The review is desk-based and therefore dependent on publicly available material. Many interventions lack independent evaluations; some programme results are self-reported; and attribution of changes in violence or cohesion to specific interventions is often difficult. The review distinguishes evidence from claims, identifies contested issues as contested, and avoids assigning collective blame to ethnic or religious communities.

2.7 Conflict sensitivity and ethics

The review uses conflict-sensitive language, avoids reproducing unverified allegations, protects confidential information, triangulates significant claims where possible, and recognises that communities may hold substantially different accounts of the same event or intervention.

3. Conflict and Polarisation Landscape

3.1 Key drivers

The literature identifies several interlocking drivers of conflict and polarisation in North-Central Nigeria.

- Land and natural-resource competition. Competition over farmland, water and grazing routes remains the most visible driver, particularly in Benue. Environmental degradation, desertification and irregular rainfall have intensified pressure on resources and contributed to southward movement by pastoralist groups.
- Ethnic and religious identities. Resource disputes are frequently framed in ethno-religious terms. These narratives deepen mistrust, complicate resolution and can turn local incidents into wider communal crises.
- Indigene–settler relations. In Plateau, contested distinctions between “indigenes” and “settlers” shape access to land, political representation and economic opportunity. This categorisation has been mobilised by political and religious elites and remains central to recurrent conflict.
- Political mobilisation. Political actors have often mobilised ethnic and religious identities for electoral or administrative advantage. Disputed local-government boundaries, unresolved commission reports and contested political geography have sustained grievances.
- Displacement and livelihoods. Large-scale displacement has altered settlement patterns, weakened livelihoods and created new territorial realities that many interventions have yet to address.
- Misinformation and inflammatory narratives. Social-media misinformation, rumours and hate speech can deepen divisions and accelerate reprisal dynamics, particularly after violent incidents.

- Governance, justice and accountability. Weak policing, limited prosecutions and a history of commissions of inquiry without visible accountability have eroded trust in the state and reinforced cycles of reprisal.
- Economic dimensions. Markets, trade networks and access to economic space have repeatedly been sites where competition is articulated and sometimes where violence begins or is targeted.

3.2 Evolution, 2016–2026

The period under review saw an escalation of farmer–herder violence, increasing criminality, and severe attacks on civilians. In Benue, recurrent attacks, kidnapping and theft have been linked to competition over land, food and water, with major displacement. The June 2025 Yelwata attack, in which at least 150 people were reported killed, marked a particularly severe escalation.[2] In Plateau, the April 2025 Zike attack and the March 2026 Palm Sunday attack in Angwan Rukuba illustrated the continuing lethality of communal violence and the speed with which competing narratives can circulate afterwards.[3]

3.3 Social cohesion

Social cohesion in the region is shaped by a legacy of "partitioned cohesion": colonial and post-colonial arrangements created internally cohesive identity groups without building cohesion across groups. The "minorities as political majority" paradox also matters: smaller administrative units can give some groups political advantages within their geographic confines, shaping competition over power and resources. At the same time, shared civic identities, such as the documented "Jos identity", offer potential entry points for peacebuilding that cut across religious and ethnic divides.[4]

4. Intervention Mapping

4.1 Overview

The review identified a diverse landscape of interventions implemented by government institutions, international and national NGOs, faith-based organisations, community groups,

2 BBC Pidgin "Benue Killings: Timeline of Attacks Wey Don Lead to Mass Deaths for Central Nigeria in Di Last 60 Days." *BBC News Pidgin*. Accessed October 5, 2026. https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/articles/cvg85vlgpm5o.

3 Last, Alex. "Nigeria's Herder-Farmer Conflict: Deadly Mix of Religion, Cattle and Land in Plateau State." BBC News, March 22, 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyv1j8ne7ko.

4 Mang, Henry Gyang. "Minorities as a Political Majority: Power and Reciprocity within and Outside the Small Geographic Boundaries of a North-Central Nigerian State." Essay. In *Minorities in Africa* 2. Centro di Studi Africani Sardegna (CSAS), 2012. https://www.affrica.org/politics-and-minorities-in-africa/; Also, Mang, Henry Gyang, and Sani Samuel Abdullahi. "'Understanding Indigeneity, Ethno-Religious Superiority and Historical Memory through the Narrations of Youth in Plateau State.' Paper Presented at the 66th Annual Conference of the Historical Society of Nigeria. Tuesday, October 12 – Friday, October 15, 2021, Enugu State, Nigeria." In *Proceedings of The 66th Annual Historical Society of Nigeria Conference* . Enugu, 2021.

media organisations, development partners and security actors. Many interventions are multi-state and address more than one driver of conflict. The strongest concentration of documented programming is in Plateau and Benue, with important regional programmes extending to Nasarawa, Kogi, Kaduna, Katsina, Taraba and beyond.

4.2 Major interventions

Table 1 summarises the principal interventions identified in the review. It is not exhaustive; it focuses on interventions with sufficient documented information to support analysis.

Intervention	Lead implementer / support	Location	Main approach	Reported results / evidence status
GIZ PEACECORE II (2023–2027)	GIZ; Plateau Peace Building Agency (PPBA)	Plateau, Kaduna, Taraba	Conflict transformation, livelihoods, environmental sustainability, psychosocial support, youth engagement	Over 50 agreements; 2,000+ people engaged on social cohesion; 112 children received psychosocial support; 784 people reported income increases after mini-grants. Moderate evidence; sustainability untested.[5]
Building Bridges for Peace II	YIAVHA; SPRiNG/FCDO	Riyom, Plateau	Inter-community dialogue, local peace accords, joint committees	Joint Berom–Fulani communiqué; land-access and joint-patrol committees; monthly joint meetings. Limited independent evaluation.[6]
HD multi-level dialogue and EWER	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; GIZ; PPBA	Plateau and wider Middle Belt	Multi-stakeholder roundtables, peace structures, early warning and early response	71 peace structures strengthened; EWER strategy and procedures developed. Outcomes depend on implementation and funding.[7]

5 "PEACECORE II: Strengthening Capacities for Conflict Transformation and Livelihood for Groups in Vulnerable Situations in Nigeria's Central Zone." giz.de, 2025. https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2025-en-peacecore-ii.pdf.

6 YIAVHA Nigeria. "Building Bridges for Peace II: From Insight to Action (Bb4peace II)." *YIAVHA Nigeria*, 2024. https://yiavha.org/building-bridges-for-peace-ii-from-insight-to-action-bb4peace-ii/.

7 Hillert, L., Nyaga, C, Viehoff, A., Steinkraus, A, and Whitaker, E. Rep. *Outcome Overview: Nigeria Project: Multi-Level Approaches to Sustainable Peace in Nigeria's Middle Belt. Adelphi Research*., October 2025. https://weatheringrisk.org/sites/default/files/document/WRPP_Nigeria_Evaluation_Synthesis.pdf#1#1; Nanlong, Marie-Therese. "Plateau: Peace Actors Seek Effective Cross-Border Control to Tackle Insecurity." *Vanguard News*, October 9, 2025.

Intervention	Lead implementer / support	Location	Main approach	Reported results / evidence status
PARSULP	Global Peace Development; UKAID/SPRiNG	Benue, Plateau, Kaduna, Katsina	Participatory planning, climate-smart agriculture, agroforestry, dialogue	42 community peace and resilience plans developed across 45 wards. Early-stage evidence.[8]
WOPPI / Women, Peace and Security	WOPPI; SPRiNG	Plateau	Institutional strengthening, women's participation	Revitalised State Action Plan Implementation Committee; broader representation of women, youth and persons with disabilities. Moderate evidence of institutional output.[9]
ECOWAS HDP Initiative	ECOWAS; Plateau State Government	Mangu, Bokkos, Barkin Ladi, Riyom, Bassa	Humanitarian–development–peace support for women and children	Relief, education, nutrition, health and psychosocial support; ₦26 million committed for psychosocial programmes. Output-level evidence.[10]
I-RENEW / Jebbu Bassa skills centre	Search for Common Ground; EU; JISRA	Bassa, Plateau	Interfaith engagement, savings groups, vocational skills	Village savings and loans association evolved into a community skills centre. Promising community-led model; limited evaluation.[11]

https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/10/plateau-peace-actors-seek-effective-cross-border-control-to-tackle-insecurity/.

8 Matthew, Amos Ebute. "Farmers–Herders Conflict: GPD Launches PARSULP Peacebuilding Project across Four States." *New Nigerian Newspaper*, November 18, 2025. https://www.newnigeriannewspapers.ng/farmers-herders-conflict-gpd-launches-parsulp-peacebuilding-project-across-four-states/.

9 Donnelly, Peter. "Strengthening Capacity for Realising Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Plateau State." *SPRiNG*, March 11, 2026. https://www.spring-nigeria.com/2026/03/11/strengthening-capacity-for-realising-women-peace-and-security-agenda-in-plateau-state/.

10 Inaju, Daniel. "ECOWAS Launches Humanitarian– Development–Peace (HDP) Initiative to Support Women and Children Affected by Armed Conflict in Plateau State." *ECOWAS / CEDEAO*, 2025. https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-launches-humanitarian-development-peace-hdp-initiative-to-support-women-and-children-affected-by-armed-conflict-in-plateau-state/.

11 SFCG Nigeria. "Religious Engagement in Nigeria Enhanced by Women (I-Renew)." *Search for Common Ground*, 2024. https://www.sfcg.org/project/religious-engagement-in-nigeria-enhanced-by-women-i-renew/

Intervention	Lead implementer / support	Location	Main approach	Reported results / evidence status
Plan International Youth Peacebuilding Academy	Plan International; US Department of State	Jos North and other Plateau communities	Youth leadership, community theatre, dialogue	Jos-Jarawa Peace Parley used forum theatre to enable dialogue. Long-term impact not evaluated.[12]
DUBAWA/DAIDAC media-literacy project	CJID/DUBAWA; Canada Fund for Local Initiatives	Plateau and Kano	Community media literacy, counter-disinformation, local radio	Workshops for youth, women, faith and community leaders; Hausa and English materials. Too recent for outcome evaluation.[13]
HD Benue natural-resource agreements	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue	Konshisha–Oju; Benue statewide	Climate-sensitive mediation, resource-sharing agreements, implementation committee	Konshisha–Oju agreement (2023); statewide agreement (2026); Benue Peace Implementation Committee established. Independent evaluation reports reduced violence and improved relations in Konshisha–Oju.[14]
UN Human Security Programme	UNDP, UNHCR, FAO	Benue and Nasarawa	Integrated protection, livelihoods, dialogue, early warning	1,261,000 beneficiaries reported; joint cooperatives; protection groups; EWERS installed. Some systems were still not fully functional at evaluation.[15]

12 Fadam, Lucky J, and Hussaini U Tsaku. "Jos-Jarawa Peace Parley: A Shade Tree Theatre Follow-up on the Youth Peacebuilding Academy (YPA) Project in Jos North LGA of Plateau State." *Afa'-Zinan: Journal of Theatre and Media Studies*, January 1, 2024. https://oer.tsuniversity.edu.ng/index.php/jtms/article/view/1627.

13 Dubawa. "Dubawa, DAIDAC Launch Project to Combat Disinformation, Boost Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria." *Dubawa*, November 13, 2025. https://dubawa.org/dubawa-daidac-launch-project-to-combat-disinformation-boost-peacebuilding-in-northern-nigeria/.

14 Hillert, L., Nyaga, C, Viehoff, A., Steinkraus, A, and Whitaker, E. Rep. *Outcome Overview: Nigeria Project: Multi-Level Approaches to Sustainable Peace in Nigeria's Middle Belt. Adelphi Research*, October 2025. https://weatheringrisk.org/sites/default/files/document/WRPP_Nigeria_Evaluation_Synthesis.pdf#1#; Hillert, Lina. "Multi-Level Approaches to Sustainable Peace in Nigeria's Middle Belt: Key Findings from Evaluating Climate-Sensitive Peace Programming." climate-diplomacy.org, 2025. https://climate-diplomacy.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/HDNigeriaOutcomeEval_final_29.10_0.pdf#3#2.

15 UN.Org. "Transitioning from Humanitarian Relief to Long-Term Development: Addressing the Herdsmen-Farmers Conflict in Nigeria – The Human Security Unit." *UN.Org*. Accessed October 11, 2026. https://www.un.org/humansecurity/hsprogramme/herders-farmers-conflict/#1.

Intervention	Lead implementer / support	Location	Main approach	Reported results / evidence status
SPRiNG ADR and community peace committees	Tetra Tech; FCDO	Benue	Traditional-ruler training, community peace committees, livelihoods	172 traditional rulers trained; 112 women trained; about 80 disputes reported resolved; seed grants disbursed. Programme-reported evidence.[16]
Military-mediated dialogue	Nigerian Army, Operation Whirl Stroke	Benue and Nasarawa border communities	Non-kinetic dialogue, trust-building, intelligence sharing	Over 100 Fulani and Tiv leaders engaged; reported intelligence cooperation and conditions for return. Early and largely official-source evidence.[17]
Search for Common Ground	SFCG; multiple donors	Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa, Taraba	Intergroup mediation, dialogue, media, community empowerment	Dialogue platforms, theatre, radio and safety committees; randomised evaluation of dialogue workshops under way.[18]
CDD Youth and Media Fellowship	CDD West Africa; Netherlands Embassy	Otukpo, Obi, Gwer-West, Benue	Counter-misinformation fellowship, stakeholder dialogue	15 media practitioners selected; weekly fact-based publications; intergroup dialogue with over 80 stakeholders. Early-stage evidence.[19]
UNFPA women and girls' safe space	UNFPA; Norway and Japan	Makurdi, Benue	Protection, psychosocial support, vocational training, cash assistance	Safe space, health clinic, vocational training and cash assistance for displaced women and girls; over 50,000 people reached with GBV/SRH services.[20]

16 Ande-Acka, Tor. "Spring, Tetra Tech Train Thousands on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Conflict Management Others in Benue – Akya." *Independent Newspaper Nigeria*, June 23, 2026. https://independent.ng/spring-tetra-tech-train-thousands-on-alternative-dispute-resolution-conflict-management-others-in-benue-akya/#1.

17 Adbdulraman, Alabidun Shuaib. "Military Brokers Peace Talks between Fulani, Tiv Leaders in Benue." *CITIZEN FM*, January 28, 2026. https://citizenfm.ng/military-brokers-peace-talks-between-fulani-tiv-leaders-in-benue/#respond.

18 Bentu, Sarah Nankyer, Shedrack Gaya Best, and Ibrahim Bulus Kwopnan. "Search for Common Ground and Peace Building in North Central Nigeria." *University of Jos Journal of Political Science*, October 10, 2025. https://journals.unijos.edu.ng/index.php/ujjps/article/view/597.

19 Ike, James. "CDD, Partners Mobilise Benue Stakeholders against, Disinformation, Misinformation, Hate Speech." *Roots Reporters*, March 15, 2026. https://rootsreporters.com.ng/cdd-partners-mobilise-benue-stakeholders-against-disinformation-misinformation-hate-speech.

Intervention	Lead implementer / support	Location	Main approach	Reported results / evidence status
HumAngle CMPP	HumAngle; Canada Fund for Local Initiatives	Plateau and Benue	Conflict-sensitive journalism, solutions and data journalism	Journalist training and multi-stakeholder roundtables on misinformation. Recent; outcome evidence limited.[21]
Mercy Corps CIPP	Mercy Corps; USAID	Benue, Kogi, Plateau, Katsina, Kano, Kaduna	Radio drama, mediation, community capacity	"My Neighbor My Friend" radio drama in Hausa, Tiv and English; reported community-level behavioural change. Anecdotal and programme-reported evidence.[22]

4.3 Actors and funders

Government actors include the Plateau Peace Building Agency, Benue State Government institutions, the Nigerian Army and federal peace and security structures. International actors include GIZ, FCDO/SPRiNG, the EU, ECOWAS, UNDP, UNHCR, FAO, UNFPA, USAID, the Netherlands Embassy and the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives. Nigerian civil-society and community actors include YIAVHA, WOPPI, Search for Common Ground, CDD West Africa, CJID/DUBAWA, HumAngle, Global Peace Development, Plan International, Mercy Corps and local peace committees.

A common feature is the use of the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. Interventions increasingly combine protection, livelihoods, dialogue, governance and psychosocial support rather than treating peacebuilding as a stand-alone activity. However, coordination remains uneven, and several interventions operate through short project cycles that complicate continuity.

4.4 Geographic distribution

In Plateau, interventions cluster in Jos North, Jos South, Mangu, Riyom, Barkin Ladi and Bassa. Communities in Wase and more remote parts of Bokkos and Barkin Ladi appear underserved despite being conflict-affected. In Benue, programming is concentrated in Guma, Gwer-West, Makurdi and, more recently, Logo and Otukpo-area communities, while riverine and harder-to-

20 Charles, John. "UNFPA to Provide Life-Saving Kits for 100,000 Vulnerable Benue Residents." *Punch Newspapers*, June 26, 2026. https://punchng.com/unfpa-to-provide-life-saving-kits-for-100000-vulnerable-benue-residents/#1.

21 Kpilaakaa, Johnstone. "Humangle Trains Journalists in Benue on Solutions and Data Reporting in Conflict Contexts." *HumanAngle* , 2026. https://humanglemedia.com/humangle-trains-journalists-in-benue-on-solutions-and-data-reporting-in-conflict-context.

22 Prosper Global. "Program Empowers Media Practitioners to Serve as Advocates of Peace." *Prosper Global*, June 27, 2022. https://nigeria.mercycorps.org/blog/program-media-advocates-peace.

reach areas remain less covered. Cross-border areas with Nasarawa, Taraba, Bauchi and Kaduna are particularly important because conflict, displacement, cattle rustling and criminal networks move across state boundaries.

5. Analysis by Intervention Type

5.1 Dialogue, mediation and reconciliation

Dialogue and mediation are the most common approaches. HD's work in Benue illustrates a sustained, multi-level model: localised dialogue evolved into the Konshisha–Oju Natural Resource Peace Agreement in 2023 and a statewide agreement in 2026. These processes brought together traditional rulers, religious leaders, women, youth and diaspora representatives, and linked resource access to climate adaptation. An independent evaluation reported reduced violent clashes, improved inter-communal relations and reopened markets in Konshisha–Oju, while also identifying incomplete boundary demarcation and youth disengagement as risks.[23]

Search for Common Ground has used intergroup mediation, participatory theatre, radio and community empowerment across Benue, Plateau and Nasarawa. Its approach seeks to transform destructive relationships into constructive engagement rather than simply end violence. A randomised evaluation of inter-dialogue workshops across 288 communities is under way, which may provide some of the strongest future evidence on whether dialogue reduces farmer–herder conflict.[24]

The Nigerian Army has also used dialogue as a non-kinetic tool, bringing together Fulani and Tiv leaders in Benue. This is significant because security actors are often present only through enforcement. However, military-facilitated dialogue raises questions about sustainability, civilian ownership and the risk that communities participate primarily because of security pressure.[25]

5.2 Farmer–herder and natural-resource interventions

Farmer–herder interventions combine mediation with practical resource governance. HD's agreements address water, forests, grazing areas, markets and climate adaptation. PEACECORE II combines conflict transformation with livelihoods, environmental sustainability and psychosocial support. PARSULP uses participatory rural appraisals to develop community peace

23 Hillert, Lina. "Multi-Level Approaches to Sustainable Peace in Nigeria's Middle Belt: Key Findings from Evaluating Climate-Sensitive Peace Programming." *Climate-Diplomacy.org*, 2025. https://climate-diplomacy.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/HDNigeriaOutcomeEval_final_29.10_0.pdf#3#2.
24 SFCG Nigeria. "Religious Engagement in Nigeria Enhanced by Women (I-Renew)." *Search for Common Ground*, 2024. https://www.sfcg.org/project/religious-engagement-in-nigeria-enhanced-by-women-i-renew/.
25 Adbdulraman, Alabidun Shuaib. "Military Brokers Peace Talks between Fulani, Tiv Leaders in Benue." *CITIZEN FM*, January 28, 2026. https://citizenfm.ng/military-brokers-peace-talks-between-fulani-tiv-leaders-in-benue/#respond.

and resilience plans. The UN Human Security Programme supported joint farmer–herder cooperatives, alternative fodder initiatives and boreholes.

These interventions are promising because they address material drivers rather than only symptoms. Their limitation is that resource agreements and livelihood activities cannot by themselves resolve contested land tenure, weak enforcement, criminality or political incentives. Implementation, financing and local ownership are therefore decisive.

5.3 Interfaith and inter-community initiatives

Interfaith work includes the EU-supported I-RENEW project, the Cordoba Peace Institute's sequenced model of intra-faith engagement, interfaith dialogue and joint action, and community-led initiatives such as the Jebbu Bassa skills centre. The Cordoba model is notable because it moves beyond dialogue to "diapraxis": religious actors jointly implement practical community activities. This can make cooperation visible and beneficial to everyday life.[26]

Interfaith initiatives appear most effective when they engage credible local religious leaders, include women and youth, and link dialogue to concrete action. Their risk is symbolic engagement: events and declarations that do not change local relationships, resource access or security conditions.

5.4 Traditional and community-based mechanisms

Traditional rulers, elders, women leaders and community peace committees are frequently the first responders to local disputes. SPRiNG trained 172 traditional rulers in alternative dispute resolution in Benue and supported community peace committees that reported resolving about 80 disputes. In Plateau, the Bangai accord established land-access and joint-patrol committees. These structures are valuable because they are close to communities and can act before disputes escalate.

Their weaknesses are capacity, inclusivity, gender balance and accountability. Customary mechanisms may exclude women, youth, minorities or displaced people unless deliberately designed otherwise. They also require linkage to formal justice and security systems where disputes involve serious crimes.

5.5 Youth and women's peacebuilding

Youth interventions include Plan International's Youth Peacebuilding Academy, PEACECORE II's youth engagement, and local youth-led dialogue and patrol committees. Women's interventions include UNFPA safe spaces, SPRiNG livelihood and peacebuilding training, WOPPI's support to

26 Cordoba Peace Institute. "From Dialogue to Practice: Interfaith Peace Building in Nigeria Middle Belt - Cordoba Peace Institute: English." *cpigeneva.org*, June 6, 2026. https://cpi-geneva.org/from-dialogue-to-practice-interfaith-peace-building-in-nigeria-middle-belt/.

Plateau's Women, Peace and Security action plan, and ECOWAS support for displaced women and children.

The evidence suggests that women and youth are often included as beneficiaries but less often as decision-makers. Genuine inclusion requires formal roles in peace committees, budgetary support, protection from reprisal, and pathways from economic empowerment into leadership and civic participation.

5.6 Media, misinformation and peace communication

Media interventions include HumAngle's conflict-sensitive and solutions journalism training, CDD's Youth and Media Fellowship, DUBAWA/DAIDAC community media literacy, and Mercy Corps' radio drama "My Neighbor My Friend". These interventions respond to the role of misinformation, hate speech and unverified claims in accelerating violence.

The most promising models operate at community level rather than only in newsrooms. They engage faith leaders, youth influencers, women leaders and local radio stations, and produce content in locally relevant languages. However, most are recent, and there is not yet sufficient independent evidence to assess their effect on violence, trust or polarisation.

5.7 Justice, accountability and governance

Justice and accountability remain the weakest area of intervention. Plateau has a long history of commissions of inquiry, but research finds that these processes have often documented violence without producing prosecutions or durable reform. This has contributed to distrust in both inquiry processes and the state.[27] Early-warning systems, peace agencies and implementation committees are important institutional advances, but they must be resourced, empowered and connected to credible justice pathways.

5.8 Livelihoods and economic interventions

Livelihood interventions include joint cooperatives, vocational training, mini-grants, seed grants, skills centres, climate-smart agriculture and market reopening. PEACECORE II reports that 784 people experienced a 200 per cent income increase after receiving mini-grants, while SPRiNG disbursed ₦37.5 million in seed grants to 30 conflict-affected individuals. These results are encouraging but should be treated as programme-reported outputs, not proof of conflict reduction.

Economic interventions appear most effective when they create shared interests across conflict lines, such as farmer–herder feed cooperatives or joint market activity. They are less effective

27 Marjoke Oosterom, Dung Pam Sha, and Dowd, Caitriona. "Commissions of Inquiry and Pathways to Accountability in Plateau State, Nigeria." *Cambridge.org*, 2021. https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/81878F53E9B272A4A309E688C7F3D13A/S0022278X21000252a.pdf/commissions_of_inquiry_and_pathways_to_accountability_in_plateau_state_nigeria.pdf.

when they provide individual assistance without addressing access to land, security, market access or inter-group relations.

6. Plateau State Case Analysis

6.1 Conflict context

Plateau's conflict is shaped by the indigene–settler dichotomy, ethno-religious polarisation, contested political representation, land and mineral-resource competition, criminality and displacement. The 2001 Jos crisis is widely regarded as a watershed that entrenched these divisions. Historical narratives concerning the pre-colonial jihad, slave raiding, colonial indirect rule and post-independence political competition continue to inform contemporary grievance and mobilisation.

The state's conflict is therefore not simply a farmer–herder problem. It is a layered crisis in which economic competition and insecurity are frequently expressed through ethnic and religious identities. This makes interventions that address only one driver unlikely to produce durable change.

6.2 Intervention landscape

Plateau has a comparatively developed peacebuilding architecture, anchored by the Plateau Peace Building Agency. Major interventions include GIZ PEACECORE II, HD's multi-level roundtables and early-warning work, YIAVHA's Building Bridges for Peace II, PARSULP, WOPPI's Women, Peace and Security work, ECOWAS's HDP initiative, I-RENEW, Plan International's youth peacebuilding work, and DUBAWA/DAIDAC media-literacy programming.

6.3 What the evidence shows

PEACECORE II reports more than 50 agreements between conflicting parties, over 2,000 people engaged on social cohesion, psychosocial support for 112 children, 21 infrastructure projects, and income increases among 784 mini-grant recipients. These are substantial outputs, but their effect on violence, trust and cohesion over time is not yet independently established.[28]

The *Bangai* Berom–Fulani accord in Riyom shows how local dialogue can translate into practical commitments: a land-access committee, joint patrols, monthly meetings and commitments on grazing, drug circulation and environmental practices. This is a promising model of community-

28 "PEACECORE II: Strengthening Capacities for Conflict Transformation and Livelihood for Groups in Vulnerable Situations in Nigeria's Central Zone." *www.giz.de*, 2025. https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2025-en-peacecore-ii.pdf.

owned implementation, but it remains vulnerable without enforcement, security support and continued facilitation.[29]

HD's contribution in Plateau lies less in single accords, as seen in examples such as the Bangai Berom–Fulani accord; instead, it has focused on institutionalising dialogue by strengthening peace structures across a wide network in Northern Plateau, bringing both micro-level and macro-level actors to the dialogue table, while providing the PPBA the capacity to sustain these dialogues and to further develop their early-warning procedures. The principal challenge is whether these structures can operate effectively without continuous external facilitation and whether roundtable commitments become enforceable action.[30]

6.4 Gaps and sustainability

Key gaps include weak accountability, limited engagement with the political economy of violence, insufficient trauma and mental-health support, fragmented early-warning systems, limited attention to substance abuse, and women's inclusion that remains more numerical than substantive. Cross-border dynamics involving Bauchi, Kaduna and Nasarawa, as well as forest and mining areas, remain poorly addressed.

Plateau's main sustainability asset is the PPBA. Interventions that integrate with PPBA-managed structures are more likely to endure than those that create parallel committees. The central sustainability question is whether state commitment, funding and technical capacity can sustain these structures beyond donor project cycles.

7. Benue State Case Analysis

7.1 Conflict context

Benue's conflict is strongly shaped by competition between farming and pastoralist communities over land, water and grazing routes, compounded by criminality, displacement, climate stress and contested policy. The 2017 Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law is a particularly consequential intervention. Farmers have largely viewed it as protective, while many herders have perceived it as exclusionary and threatening to livelihoods. Research cited in the review links its enforcement period to increased conflict incidents and fatalities, as well as herder displacement into neighbouring states, although causality is complex and should not be read as a simple one-way effect.[31]

29 YIAVHA Nigeria. "Building Bridges for Peace II: From Insight to Action (Bb4peace II)." *YIAVHA Nigeria*, 2024. https://yiavha.org/building-bridges-for-peace-ii-from-insight-to-action-bb4peace-ii/.

30 Hillert, Lina. "Multi-Level Approaches to Sustainable Peace in Nigeria's Middle Belt: Key Findings from Evaluating Climate-Sensitive Peace Programming." *climate-diplomacy.org*, 2025. https://climate-diplomacy.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/HDNigeriaOutcomeEval_final_29.10_0.pdf#3#2.

31 Achem, Victor Onyilor. "How Nigeria's Grazing Law Also Shapes Land Divisions and Violence." *The Conversation*, May 13, 2026. https://theconversation.com/how-nigerias-grazing-law-also-shapes-land-divisions-and-violence-268923.

The June 2025 Yelwata attack demonstrated the severity of the crisis and the scale of displacement. Humanitarian responses, including UNFPA's support for displaced women and girls, address urgent protection needs but do not resolve the underlying conflict.

7.2 Intervention landscape

Benue's intervention landscape has relied heavily on externally facilitated dialogue, especially through HD, alongside UN programming, SPRiNG's justice and community-peace work, Search for Common Ground's mediation and dialogue, military-facilitated dialogue, media and misinformation interventions, and humanitarian support for displaced populations.

7.3 What the evidence shows

HD's Konshisha–Oju agreement is the clearest example of a documented outcome. An independent evaluation found reduced violent clashes, improved inter-communal relations and reopened markets. Local committees introduced rotational systems for water and grazing areas. However, incomplete boundary demarcation, youth scepticism and funding constraints remain major risks.[32]

The 2026 statewide Natural Resource Peace Agreement (part of the Konshisha–Oju agreement) extends this approach to ten community groups and has helped establish the Benue Peace Implementation Committee. This is an important step towards institutionalisation, but its value will depend on whether the committee receives authority, funding and technical support to monitor compliance and resolve disputes.[33]

SPRiNG's community peace committees and traditional-ruler training show a practical model for local dispute resolution. Its reported results include 172 traditional rulers trained, 112 women trained, about 80 disputes resolved, and seed grants disbursed. These are encouraging programme results, though independent verification of long-term effects is limited.[34]

7.4 Gaps and sustainability

Benue's main gaps are weak accountability, incomplete implementation of resource agreements, limited engagement of formerly mobilised youth, insufficient coverage of riverine and remote communities, and weak monitoring and evaluation. The state has made progress through the Peace Implementation Committee and related institutions, but peace infrastructure remains more dependent on external facilitation than as seen in Plateau's PPBA-centred model.

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32 Hillert, L., Nyaga, C, Viehoff, A., Steinkraus, A, and Whitaker, E. Rep. *Outcome Overview: Nigeria Project: Multi-Level Approaches to Sustainable Peace in Nigeria's Middle Belt. Adelphi Research*., October 2025. https://weatheringrisk.org/sites/default/files/document/WRPP_Nigeria_Evaluation_Synthesis.pdf#1#1.

33 See Hillert *et.al above*.

34 Vande-Acka, Tor. "Spring, Tetra Tech Train Thousands on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Conflict Management Others in Benue – Akya." *Independent Newspaper Nigeria*, June 23, 2026. https://independent.ng/spring-tetra-tech-train-thousands-on-alternative-dispute-resolution-conflict-management-others-in-benue-akya/#1.

The central lesson from Benue is that agreements are necessary but insufficient. Implementation requires boundary resolution, resourced local committees, inclusive participation, security cooperation and sustained political commitment.

8. Wider North-Central Findings

8.1 Nasarawa

Nasarawa shares farmer–herder dynamics with Benue and Plateau and has been directly affected by policy and displacement spillovers. The review identifies a source noting a 113% increase in conflict incidents in Nasarawa following the period associated with Benue's grazing-law enforcement, illustrating how state-level policy can have cross-border consequences.[35] Interventions in Nasarawa must account for multi-scalar identity dynamics and the movement of communities, livestock and criminal networks across boundaries.

8.2 Kogi

Kogi's conflict dynamics reflect competition among the Igala, Ebira and Okun groups, alongside farmer–herder tensions, boundary disputes and economic hardship. Government support for traditional institutions and a Forward Operating Base in Bagana are documented responses. The state illustrates the importance of avoiding interventions that reinforce perceptions of exclusion or domination among smaller groups.

8.3 Niger

In Niger, farmer–herder tensions have increasingly intersected with organised banditry, kidnapping and cattle rustling. The state's reconciliation committees report about 70 per cent success in resolving disputes, though the basis for this figure requires further verification. The Niger case shows that peacebuilding must be integrated with responses to organised crime, protection and livelihoods, rather than treating violence as purely communal.

8.4 Kwara and the FCT

Kwara and the Federal Capital Territory have distinct identity and political geographies. In Kwara, Yoruba, Nupe and Baruba communities coexist within a complex political setting. In the FCT, indigenous groups can be numerical minorities in their own territory while larger migrant populations hold substantial economic and political influence. Both contexts underline the need for conflict analysis specific to local political geography rather than a generic North-Central template.

35 Tade, Oludayo, and Yikwab Peter Yikwabs. "Conflict Triggers between Farming and Pastoral Communities in Nasarawa State, Nigeria." *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research* 12, no. 3 (2020): 101–14. https://doi.org/10.1108/jacpr-10-2019-0448.

8.5 Cross-cutting regional themes

Across the region, five themes recur: the politicisation of identity; the importance of land and resource governance; displacement and contested territorial realities; misinformation as an accelerator of violence; and impunity as a driver of reprisal. Regional programmes are increasingly recognising these connections, but implementation remains fragmented across state boundaries.

9. What Appears to Have Worked

The evidence base is uneven, but several approaches appear promising.

- Sustained, inclusive mediation. HD's multi-year processes in Benue produced agreements, local resource-governance arrangements and independently assessed reductions in violence in Konshisha–Oju.
- Locally owned peace structures. Community peace committees, land-access committees and joint patrol committees can resolve disputes before they escalate, particularly when they include traditional rulers, women, youth and security actors.
- Institutional anchoring. The PPBA provides a state-owned platform to coordinate multiple interventions. Integrating projects into existing structures reduces the risk of parallel, short-lived committees.
- Linking dialogue to practical action. Interfaith initiatives and farmer–herder programmes are more convincing when dialogue leads to joint markets, resource committees, skills centres, infrastructure or cooperative production.
- Climate-sensitive resource governance. Agreements that address water, grazing, forests and climate adaptation engage material drivers rather than only immediate disputes.
- Community-level information integrity. Media literacy, conflict-sensitive journalism, and local radio engagement are promising responses to misinformation, especially when they involve faith leaders, youth influencers, and community leaders.13,19,21
- Women's institutional participation. Reviving the Plateau State Action Plan Implementation Committee shows that women's inclusion requires formal mandates, membership reform and coordination structures, not only training or beneficiary quotas.

10. What Has Not Worked or Remains Inconclusive

- Commissions of inquiry without accountability. Inquiries have documented violence and temporarily reduced tensions, but have rarely produced prosecutions or durable

institutional reform. This has particularly weakened trust in Plateau State. This also occurs in other states, but to a lesser extent.

- Policy interventions without inclusive implementation. Benue's anti-open-grazing law illustrates how exclusionary or poorly implemented legal frameworks can deepen grievance and displace tensions across borders, even where the policy has legitimate protective objectives.
- Short-term, donor-driven projects. Interventions that prioritise workshop numbers, trainings and visible outputs over local ownership and institutional integration often struggle to survive beyond funding periods.
- Parallel structures. Creating new committees without linking them to existing state or community institutions can duplicate effort, exhaust local volunteers and collapse when projects end.
- Tokenistic inclusion. Women and youth are frequently reached as beneficiaries but remain underrepresented in decision-making. Economic empowerment alone does not necessarily translate into political influence.
- Media and misinformation interventions. These are promising but mostly recent. Insufficient evidence shows whether they reduce violent incidents, improve trust, or sustain resilience after funding ends.
- Livelihood support as a stand-alone solution. Grants, vocational training and infrastructure can improve wellbeing, but they do not by themselves address land tenure, insecurity, criminality or political manipulation.
- Early-warning systems. Systems have been installed in several locations, but evaluations indicate that some were not yet fully functional, and mistrust can reduce community reporting and participation.

11. Gaps

11.1 Geographic gaps

- Remote and conflict-affected communities in Plateau, including parts of Wase, Bokkos and Barkin Ladi, appear underserved.
- Riverine and hard-to-reach areas of Benue, including parts of Logo, receive less intervention coverage than more accessible LGAs.
- Cross-border areas linking Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba, Bauchi and Kaduna require coordinated mechanisms.
- Forest, mining and transit corridors, where armed groups and illegal economic activities usually operate, remain largely outside peacebuilding reach.

11.2 Thematic gaps

- Accountability and access to justice for perpetrators and victims.
- Land governance, tenure security and equitable resource access.
- Political economy and elite incentives that sustain conflict.
- Trauma, mental health and psychosocial support at scale.
- Substance abuse among young people as a conflict accelerant.
- Early warning and early response that is fast, trusted and connected to action.
- Women's and youth leadership beyond beneficiary participation.
- Independent monitoring, evaluation and learning.

11.3 Evidence gaps

There is a dearth of independent, longitudinal evaluations. Many interventions report outputs, such as people trained or agreements signed, without evidence of changes in violence, trust, polarisation or cohesion. Attribution is further complicated by simultaneous security operations, humanitarian responses, political events and community-led initiatives.

12. Emerging Lessons

1. Local peace accords can work, but only if implemented. Agreements need named responsibilities, budgets, monitoring, dispute-resolution procedures and consequences for violations.
2. Institutional anchoring improves sustainability. State peace agencies, established committees and existing community structures are better platforms than newly created parallel bodies.
3. Dialogue must address material interests. Conversations about identity and trust are more durable when linked to land, water, grazing, markets, security and livelihoods.
4. Religious and traditional leaders matter, but inclusion must be genuine. Their authority can legitimise agreements, but processes must also include women, youth, minorities and displaced people.
5. Misinformation is a security issue. Rumours and inflammatory narratives can turn local incidents into reprisal crises; responses should be community-based, multilingual and rapid.
6. Women's inclusion requires institutional reform. Formal mandates, leadership roles, budgets and accountability are more meaningful than numerical targets alone.
7. Cross-border conflict requires cross-border responses. State-boundary programming is insufficient where displacement, livestock movement, criminal networks and grievances cross administrative lines.
8. Evidence discipline is essential. Implementers and funders should distinguish outputs from outcomes and invest in independent evaluation.

13. Opportunities for Future Programming

- Support implementation of existing agreements. Prioritise the Benue statewide agreement, Konshisha–Oju arrangements and Plateau community accords through funded implementation committees, monitoring and dispute-resolution mechanisms.
- Strengthen state peace infrastructure. Consolidate the PPBA model and support comparable, accountable institutions in Benue and other North-Central states, with clear mandates, funding and civilian oversight.
- Invest in climate-sensitive resource governance. Combine dialogue with water infrastructure, grazing management, land-use planning, climate-smart agriculture and joint market initiatives.
- Scale community-level counter-misinformation. Support local radio, fact-checking networks, media-literacy clubs, faith leaders and youth influencers, with rapid-response protocols after violent incidents.
- Deepen women's and youth leadership. Move from participation targets to decision-making roles, funding for women- and youth-led organisations, and protection mechanisms for peace actors.
- Integrate trauma and psychosocial support. Expand community-based mental-health and psychosocial services, especially for displaced people, children, women and survivors of violence.
- Build cross-border peace mechanisms. Establish joint early-warning, dialogue and security-cooperation arrangements among neighbouring states.
- Link peacebuilding to justice. Connect community mediation to formal legal pathways, witness protection, legal aid and credible accountability processes.

14. Recommendations for Further Research and Action

14.1 For JRI and research partners

- Commission independent, mixed-methods evaluations of the most significant interventions, especially HD's Benue agreements, PEACECORE II, SPRiNG community peace committees and SFCG's dialogue evaluation.
- Track agreed indicators over time, including incident trends, dispute resolution, market reopening, displacement return, trust, participation and agreement compliance.
- Research the political economy of conflict, including elite incentives, land markets, mining, criminal networks and electoral mobilisation.

- Examine cross-border conflict dynamics and the effects of state-level policy on neighbouring states.
- Evaluate misinformation interventions using measures of reach, correction, trust, reporting behaviour and, where feasible, violent incident trends.

14.2 For government

- Resource and empower peace institutions, including the PPBA and Benue's Peace Implementation Committee, with clear mandates, budgets and reporting obligations.
- Publish and act on credible inquiry findings, and strengthen prosecution, victim support and witness protection.
- Design land, grazing and resource policies through inclusive consultation, with attention to the concerns of farmers, herders, women, youth and minority communities.
- Support cross-border coordination on security, early warning, displacement and resource governance.

14.3 For donors and implementing organisations

- Fund multi-year programmes rather than short project cycles, with explicit transition and sustainability plans.
- Integrate interventions into existing peace structures rather than creating parallel committees (this will go well with the coordination and advice of agencies such as PPBA, which are expected to keep up-to-date data on various interventions.
- Require outcome-level indicators, independent evaluation and transparent reporting.
- Support women's and youth leadership, not only participation.
- Combine humanitarian relief with livelihoods, protection, dialogue and governance programming.

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